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PERFORMANCE BASED CONTRACTING  
IN  
LONG-TERM SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Abstract 
The study investigates performance-based contracting in long term-supply 
relationships.  Based on an empirical investigation involving manufacturers, retailers, 
and service providers conducted between September 2010 and March 2013, the 
present study demonstrates that performance that companies buy and sell can be 
analyzed as specific combinations of effectiveness, efficiency and risk. While firms 
engage in a complex and time-consuming process to design and agree upon short-term 
and long-term performance targets, incentive mechanisms, as well as risks of buying 
or selling future performance, they often fail in achieving excellence in all 
performance targets.  
  




At a time of shifting economic conditions and global competition for resources and 
market shares, the need for firms to engage in a performance-based contracting is 
increasing. Indeed, a great deal of government procurement, public-private 
partnerships (Roehrich & Caldwell, 2012; Roehrich, Lewis, & George, 2014) but also 
business activity in long-term supply relationships in logistics and services 
(Selviaridis & Spring, 2010; Essig, 2000; Glas, Hofmann, & Essig 2013) appears to 
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be occurring via inter-firm contracting for procuring complex performance (Araujo & 
Spring, 2010; Roehrich, Caldwell & Lewis, 2014; Caldwell, Roehrich & Davies, 
2009). 
 
Performance-based contracting is about buying and selling solutions for end-users and 
not about buying or selling transactional products or services (Davies, 2004; Essig, 
2003; Roehrich & Caldwell, 2012; Windahl, et al., 2004; Windahl & Lakemond, 
2006, 2010). Specifically, in long-term supply relationships between manufacturers 
and retailers, contracting is not about buying certain quantities of consumer products 
at agreed prices but it is about buying and selling performances that are necessary for 
end-consumers to be able to purchase the products and services that they demand. I 
use the term contracting to circumscribe a recurrent, often long-term, process of 
interdependent exchange relationships (Lusch & Brown, 1996; Cachon & Lariviere, 
2001; Mouzas & Blois, 2013). Contracting enables firms to solve problems 
transforming aspects of their resources, activities and themselves (Spekman, Kamauff, 
& Myhr, 1998; Barratt 2004; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; 
Selviaridis & Spring, 2010).  
 
Contracting incorporates a significant element of futurity (Atiyah, 1986). Yet, firms 
face the problem that they need to anticipate and ‘presentiate’ (Macneil 1974) future 
performance and manifest their agreement in a complete contract (Hart & Moore, 
1988; Schwartz, 1992; Baker et al., 2002; Mouzas & Blois, 2013; Schwartz and Scott, 
2015). This problem is evidenced in public procurement, strategic alliances, and R&D 
projects (Das & Teng, 1999, 2000; Reuer & Arino, 2003, 2007; Roehrich & Caldwell, 
2012; Roehrich et al. 2014); as well as in continuing business relationships (Harrison, 
2004; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Roxenhall & Ghauri, 2004; Scott & Schwartz, 
2015).  
 
Barriers to anticipating future performance are regarded as transaction costs 
(Williamson, 2008); they are the costs of running “market transactions” or the “costs 
of using the price mechanism” (Coase, 1988, p.7) akin to the friction in physical 
systems (Langlois, 2006). Specifically, transaction costs are a function of (1) 
information asymmetries between counterparts in supply chains and unforeseen 
contextual contingencies, (2) drafting costs, (3) enforcement costs, and (4) 
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renegotiation requirements (Williamson, 2008; Tirole, 1986, 1999, 2009). These 
formidable barriers have been discussed extensively in previous research under the 
aegis of the relational and incomplete contract theories (Macneil, 1974; Tirole, 1986; 
Hart & Moore, 1989; Schwartz, 1992; Maskin & Tirole, 1999; Brown et al., 2004; 
Taylor & Plambeck, 2007; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Reuer & Arino, 2007; Furlotti, 
2007).  
 
Although there is a substantial amount of academic work on barriers to anticipating 
future performance (Hobbs, 1996; Hobbs and Young, 2000; Cachon & Lariviere, 
2001, 2005; Williamson, 2008), there is a research gap about the ways in which firms 
attempt to overcome these barriers by developing a performance-based contracting. 
This may be attributed to a theoretical deficiency about what it means performance, 
the ingredients that constitute contractual performance and subsequent lack of 
sufficient empirical research on how firms interact to design and negotiate 
performance targets, agree upon incentive mechanisms and translate the short-term 
and long-term effects and risks of fulfilling or breaching performance promises. I 
posit that one of the missing pieces for a robust explanation of the puzzle of how 
companies overcome barriers to anticipating future performance is the lack of 
attention to the complex and time-consuming process of how companies reach 
consent on performance targets.  
 
The research gap on how firms overcome barriers to anticipating future performance 
raises new questions about 1) how firms agree upon performance targets, 2) how 
counterparts manifest their agreement with contract clauses, 3) the incentives and 
sanctions that enable and compel firms to deliver contractual performance, 4) the 
compensation that firms receive for bearing risks, 5) the conflicts and 
incompatibilities in achieving contractual performance. To address this theoretical 
deficiency, I built on Srivastava, Shervani & Fahey’s (1998) insight that firms are 
concerned with resources that are market-based assets, such as customer 
relationships, channel relationships and partner relationships; and I engaged in a 
systematic process to structure the existing literature on ‘what it means performance’ 
with a conceptual framework of the ingredients that constitute contractual 




Based on an empirical investigation, conducted between September 2010 and March 
2013 in the context of long-term supply relationships between manufacturers, service 
providers and grocery retailers, the study offers the following argument: By reaching 
consent on performance targets, firms seek to balance the need for certainty and 
calculability of future performance with the need to remain sufficiently flexible to 
innovate and embrace business opportunities. From the perspective of end-user needs, 
contracting parties attempt to balance the achievement of contractual effectiveness, in 
terms of volume, sales or market share with the need to maintain contractual 
efficiency in terms of controlling cost and operating margins and simultaneously 
control the contractual risk in terms of probability of adverse impact and 
compensating for bearing certain contractual risks. Performance can thus be analyzed 
as specific combinations of effectiveness, efficiency, and risk. This balancing act is 
challenging and firms often fail to achieve performance outcomes in all three 
combinations simultaneously.  
 
By providing a theoretical conceptualization of the ingredients of contractual 
performance and real-life empirical evidence of how companies anticipate future 
performance, the study attempts to break new ground and provide a major intellectual 
stimulus on performance-based contracting that is relevant for our understanding of 
new applications for business practice.  The novel contribution that this study makes 
is particularly useful in analyzing performance-based contracting in continuing 
business relationships (Ring & van de Ven, 1999; Das & Teng, 1999) because firms 
in these relationships anticipate long-term performance relying on economic 
incentives (Harris & Raviv, 1996; Bajari & Tadelis, 2001; Levin, 2003) and self-
reinforcing framework agreements with non-legal sanctions (Bernstein, 1992; Charny, 
1990; Scott, 2003; Mouzas & Blois, 2013; Schwartz  & Scott, 2015).   
 
 
2. Performance-based Contracting     
The rapid technological developments and the need to perform cost-competitively in 
the marketplace, provides an incentive for firms to limit the proportion of the 
resources that they hold in-house. The resources that companies need are 
idiosyncratic; and they are not available in a concentrated form, but dispersed in the 
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business landscape (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Mouzas et al., 2008; Baraldi & 
Stromsten, 2009). Firms engage in contractual relationships with counterparts to 
access the resources that they need to solve their problems (Spekman, Kamauff, & 
Myhr, 1998; Barratt, 2004). A consequence of the technological developments, 
competitive pressure and ever increasing interdependence is the need for firms to 
obtain comprehensive solutions for end-users (Essig, 2003; Roehrich & Caldwell, 
2012; Windahl & Lakemond, 2006, 2010). By designing, negotiating and 
implementing a performance-based contracting, firms’ resources will evolve in 
relation to each other according to anticipated and agreed performance targets 
(Selviaridis & Spring, 2010).  
 
Performance-based contracting is about buying and selling the performance that these 
resources would render (Essig, 2003; Roehrich & Caldwell, 2012; Glas, Hofmann, & 
Essig, 2013). More profoundly, performance-based contracting has important 
implications for the nature of resources:  A particular resource in the business 
landscape is not a fixed entity, but is the outcome of its interactions with other 
resources (Ford & Mouzas, 2009).  In this way, the use and value of services that a 
resource would render is dependent on the particular combination and characteristics 
of other resources with which the resource is combined. Some particular resources, 
such as brands, reputations, patents, market-based assets or know-how can be 
considered as ‘strategic’ resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1986, 1991; 
Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998) and there is robust empirical evidence that 
through an exchange process with other firms these resources can enhance business 
performance (Crook et al., 2008).    
 
Through a performance-based contracting between firms, resources will follow a co-
evolutionary path of change over time for the benefit of counterparties leading to their 
growing inter-dependence. Furthermore, each of the negotiated and agreed 
performances between two counterparts is connected with other firms’ performances 
forming a supply network that gives access to and affects a wide array of more or less 
distant performances (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001).   
 
By manifesting their consent on performance targets, firms may attempt to increase 
the reliability and the legal enforcement of specific performances of others. In this 
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sense, legally-enforceable contracts are manifestations of consent (McKendrick, 
2002) that “circumscribe the valuation of conduct” (Collins, 1999, p 21) and give 
legal effect to exchange relationships. Consent is an inter-cognitive achievement 
(Barnett, 1986; Barnett, 1992b; Barnett, 2002) between contracting parties which 
bring certain property rights Foss & Foss, 2005)  in the sense of entitlements to a 
system of exchange relationships (Biggart & Delbridge, 2004). Contracting parties 
could manifest their consent to performance targets at physical level, monetary level 
as well as informational or knowledge-based level (Essig & Arnold, 2001; Mouzas & 
Ford, 2012). In this way, consent between counterparts is not simply a mental state 
but an act in which there is a meeting of wills based on objective manifestations of 
intent that are legally binding. As a result, the process of contract formation has ‘hard 
edges’ (Atiyah, 1995) which makes it difficult for counterparts to reach and update 
their consent over time. 
 
 
The problem that firms face is that it is often impossible for counterparts to manifest 
their consent in a complete contract and verify contractual performance (Hart & 
More, 1988; Schwartz, 1992; Baker et al., 2002). Contract theories attempted to deal 
with this problem from a ‘relational’ or ‘incomplete’ contract perspective (Schwartz, 
1992; Tirole, 1999, 2009).  
 
Seeking a performance-based contracting with counterparts under conditions of 
information asymmetry, unforeseen contingencies and limited verifiability remains a 
critical and taunting task for business actors. In theory, the value of contracting now 
is the net present worth of all future benefits and sacrifices taking into account the 
opportunity cost of capital adjusted by the level of risk that the give-and-take process 
involves (Che & Hausch, 1999; Hart, 1995).  
 
 In practice, while some elements of a future performance can be certain, “complete, 
fully contingent, costlessly enforceable contracts are not possible” for two reasons 
(Klein 1980, p. 356).  First, unforeseen contingencies exist and it may be costly or 
impracticable to specify responses to all of them (Maskin & Tirole, 1999).  This 
source of contractual incompleteness is also attributed to bounded rationality 
(Williamson, 1979; Anderlini, & Felli, 1994; Segal, 1999; Tirole, 2009). Second, it is 
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usually expensive or effectively unfeasible for counterparts to measure some types of 
contractual performance (Hart, 1995; Tirole, 1999). These two reasons might explain 
why the incomplete contracting focused its attention on the existence of opportunistic 
transaction costs and not on mundane transaction costs which are the costs of using 
the market (Baldwin, 2007; Langlois, 2006).  
 
Williamson (1979, 1985) identifies: a) uncertainty; b) frequency; and, c) asset 
specificity as the three critical dimensions of transactions. Asset specificity, in 
particular, introduces opportunism as a cost because counterparts’ incentives are 
presumed to be misaligned (Langlois, 2006). Opportunistic transaction costs make the 
incomplete contract approach ‘crisp’ and ‘elegant’ and appear to be useful in the 
investigation of: a) inter-firm arrangements, including those categorized as ‘hybrids’ 
(Williamson, 1985, 1991); b) the use of credible commitments and threats (hostages) 
to support transactions (Williamson 1983); c) finance decisions (Williamson, 1988; 
Hart & Moore, 1989; Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Hart 1995); and, d) property rights 
Hart & Moore, 1990; Grossman & Hart, 1990; Foss & Foss, 2005).  
 
It is now well established that firms are replete with relational contracts (Gibbons & 
Henderson, 2011) and that the existence of these contracts allow the parties to adjust 
their performances when unexpected events occur (Campbell, 2001). Many of these 
contracts are ‘self-enforcing’ performance-based agreements between contracting 
parties which create a “collaboration sustained by the shadow of the future, as 
opposed to formal contracts enforced by courts” (Gibbons & Henderson, 2011, p.1).  
 
Often contracting parties see the contract as a starting point for re-negotiation and 
adjustment when circumstances change or difficulties arise rather than as carefully 
defined list of fixed obligations to perform.  Therefore, Macneil (1974, 1975, 1980, 
1983) considers the ‘true or real consent’ of contracting parties to be subjective 
(Barnett, 1992b, p. 1180). Macneil was following Macaulay (1963, 2004) who 
differentiates between the ‘paper deal’ and the ‘real deal’ and observes that firms in 
practice do not always insist on their contractual rights and do not readily consider the 
option of litigation.  In fact, firms frequently show a willingness to adjust their 
positions in order to continue to perform (Macaulay, 2004). 
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A number of studies approached relational contracting as a governance mechanism 
(Williamson, 1985, 1991, 2008; Leblebici & Shalley, 1996; Poppo & Zenger, 2002) 
that involves long-term highly specific investments (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992); 
fosters inter-firm trust (Das & Teng, 1999, 2000; Mouzas, Henneberg & Naudé, 
2007; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995); and, minimizes the risk of opportunistic 
performance (Carson et al., 2006).  Incomplete and relational approaches are useful in 
understanding barriers to anticipating future performance. Nonetheless, to explain 
how firms attempt to anticipate contractual performance, a theoretical understanding 
of the ingredients that constitute contractual performance is needed. I posit that 
performance outcomes of buying and selling solutions for end-users can be assessed 
as specific combinations of effectiveness, efficiency, and risk (Kotabe, 1998; Mentzer 
& Konrad, 1991; Kotler, Jain, & Maesincee, 2002). 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Contractual effectiveness is about buying and selling solutions that meet end-
customer or end-user needs completely. Contractual effectiveness is thus linked to the 
firms’ ability to design a unique and innovative model of meeting end-user needs 
through exchange relationships with counterparts (Gaertner & Ramnarayan, 1983; 
Mass, 2005). For this reason, effectiveness is inextricably linked with the firms’ own 
recipe to generate a sustainable business growth in their respective markets. Gaertner 
& Ramnarayan (1983) argue that effectiveness is not simply a characteristic of 
contractual outputs but a continuous process relating the firms to their constituencies; 
in this way, contractual effectiveness is negotiated rather than produced. An effective 
performance-based contracting is one that is able to create accounts that relevant 
constituencies find acceptable. These accounts may be for various purposes to various 
audiences and for various activities. In fast-moving consumer goods industry, for 
example, manufacturers and retailers jointly create accounts of ‘mindspace’ 
measuring ‘brand awareness’ among consumers; accounts of ‘consumer off-takes’ 
measuring final sales to end-consumers at the point of sale; as well as accounts of 
‘shelf-space’ measuring shelf available within retail outlets (Corstjens et al., 1995). 
Both manufacturers and retailers negotiate with each other in continuing exchange 
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relationships, and they manifest their consent for a recurrent performances aimed at 
end-consumers (Villas-Boas & Zhao, 2005; Hingley, 2005; Mouzas & Ford, 2003, 
2006; Collins, 2009; Ford & Mouzas, 2013). Hence, relevant performance-based 
accounts are not restricted to buying or selling products and services. For example, 
globally operating retailers, such as Metro, Aldi, or Wal-Mart, for example, shows 
how retailers are highly effective in financing their business growth by contracting 
with manufacturers and using them as creditors to provide working capital for their 
stores.  
 
Contractual efficiency refers to performance outcomes which result in competitive 
operating margins. Contractual efficiency is thus a measure of operational excellence 
or productivity. Therefore, contractual efficiency is linked with the firms’ ability to 
provide comprehensive solutions for end-users (Davies, 2004; Essig, 2003; Roehrich 
& Caldwell, 2012; Windahl, et al., 2004; Windahl & Lakemond, 2006, 2010) at a 
competitive prices and delivering them with minimum difficulty or inconvenience. 
Contractual efficiency is concerned with minimizing costs and improving operational 
margins. In theory, efficiency is a necessary condition or hurdle because it is about 
generating a contractual surplus above the opportunity cost; it could be formulated as 
a relative number that has profit as a numerator and sales revenue as denominator 
(Clark, 1921; Mouzas, 2006; Moran and Ghoshal, 1999). In practice, however, 
business actors cannot easily contract to buy or sell future performances for less than 
they are worth. Any attempt to explain superior efficiency must account for why 
business actors were able to acquire this contractual performance supporting such 
efficiency for a price below their rent generating capacity (Barney, 1986). In their 
attempt to explain superior efficiency, Denrell et al., (2003) elaborate their analysis 
on the empirical observation that such efficiency exists whenever prices fail to reflect 
the value of a resource's best use. This is for example the case when resources are 
complex and tailor-made or when they comprise not only tangible assets, such as 
technologies, buildings or inventories, but also intangibles such as ‘market-based’ and 
‘knowledge-based’ resources (Srivastava et al., 1998; Mouzas & Ford, 2012). 
 
As contracting parties need to expect future performance, one could posit that 
conceptually between expectations and risks exists a corresponding symmetry. Whilst 
risks are assigned probabilities to future performances, expectations are “the result of 
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drawing inferences from the available data” (Cyert & March, 1992, p. 163). These 
inferences might relate to specific contractual outcomes, relationships or business 
opportunities.  
 
Contractual risk refers to the probability that the occurrence of an event has an 
adverse impact on the performance of a contract multiplied by the size of material 
damage or economic loss. In this way, risk exposure appears highly relevant in 
assessing future performance. Risk exposure is particularly relevant in performance-
based contracting because risks are transferred to suppliers and buyers rely on high-
powered incentives that are given to their suppliers. The assets that firms utilize are 
not free of charge. Assets bear an opportunity cost of capital (Modigliani & Miller, 
1958). This is the cost of not contracting in other business opportunities of similar 
systematic risk. Therefore, the opportunity cost of capital varies from contract to 
contract, depending on risk that it involves. In practice, firms classify their contracts 
with similar risks, and calculate the net present value of their expected future revenues 
and costs. Notwithstanding that risk is passed on to suppliers, performance-based 
contracting is not an autonomous process; instead performance-based contracting is 
embedded in a spatiotemporal context. As firms operate in interconnected business 
relationships, contractual risks are transmitted from one contract to the next; and the 
adverse impact on firms may be amplified even if risks originate from seemingly 
distant relationships (Sharpe, 1990; Mouzas & Ford, 2011; Stulz, 2009).  Recent 
events, such as the credit crisis, the outbreak of food bacteria or the horsemeat fraud 
in the food industry demonstrate the profound interconnectivity of contracts and raise 
questions about how firms attempt to deal with risk in their contracting with others 
(Schwartz and Scott, 2015). Information asymmetry (Nayyar, 1990) and symmetric 
ignorance imply massively imperfect markets (Akerlof, 1970; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Stiglitz, 1993; Harris & Raviv, 1996) where risk is not equally visible to all firms. 
 
 
3. Research Methods  
The research was conducted between September 2010 and March 2013 in the context 
of long-term supply relationships between multinational firms in Germany and the 
United Kingdom. The investigated supply relationships involved manufacturers of 
consumer and pharmaceutical products (A, B), grocery retail chains (C, D) and 
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logistics service providers (E, F). The research attention was focused on eight long-
term supply relationships (AC, AD, BC, BD, AE, AF, BE, BF) between 
manufacturers, retailers, and service providers (see Figure 2).  These supply 
relationships were chosen for investigation for two reasons: First, the contracting 
between these firms is not concerned with buying or selling certain quantities of 
consumer products or services at agreed prices; instead, firms’ contracting is 
concerned with buying and selling business performances. Second, the investigated 
supply relationships form a significant part of the economy; being part of the largest 
manufacturer-retailer supply chains in Europe and generating an annual turnover of 
€200 billion. 
 
A realist epistemological stance guided empirical research endeavors (Sayer, 2000; 
Tsang & Kwan, 1999). Using case study research methods (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; 
Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki, 2008), where 
case descriptions form the basis for deeper going analysis, I used theoretical tools to 
move from surface level of description to deeper levels of explanation (Pettigrew, 
1990; Pentland, 1999); thus rigorously explain cause-and-effect links of the 
phenomena that I observed (Tsoukas, 1989; Elster, 1989; Hedstrom & Swedberg, 
1998). 
 
Data Collection: When the research was initiated in September 2010, it became clear 
that I needed to engage in a longitudinal data collection to capture inter-firm 
exchanges in their temporal and spatial context (Pettigrew et al., 2001); and 
simultaneously overcome the initial reluctance of firms to reveal sensitive information 
about their contractual agreements. For this reason, I initiated an incremental multi-
stage data collection.  
 
In the first stage of the research, which took place between September 2010 and 
March 2011, I engaged with eight key informants such as Board Members, Heads of 
Business Units, and Country Managers in the United Kingdom and Germany. The 
purpose of this initial stage of business engagement was to gain access to 
multinational firms; identify additional expert interviewees; and develop insights into 
the history and characteristics of relevant resources and negotiation processes.  In 
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addition, publicly available information in the form of 241 press releases and 32 
annual reports were collected representing a total of compilation of 864 pages.  
 
In the second stage of the research, carried out between April 2011 and March 2013, 
the pool of key informants was expanded from 8 to 83 decision makers. Interviewees 
included Corporate Lawyers, Sales Directors, Marketing Directors, Key Account 
Managers, Category Managers, Purchasing Managers, Financial Managers, 
Controllers, Auditors and Logistics Specialists. The pool of interviewees includes also 
two final semi-structured interviews with two independent auditing firms in the 
United Kingdom and Germany. I chose the auditing firms because they were experts 
in performance assessment and contracts. The purpose of these two final interviews 
was to discuss the financial and legal implications, in general; and legal enforceability 
of inter-firm contracts, in particular. Each interview was face-to-face in the native 
language of the interviewee and lasted about 45 minutes. The purpose of executing a 
second stage of data collection was to obtain copies of contracts and engage with the 
actors that are involved with the design and negotiation of performance-based 
contract clauses. Obtaining contemporary contracts was a novel method to move 
beyond subjective views obtained through interviews and examine objectified records 
and manifestations of consent between firms. Furthermore, the second stage of data 
collection placed emphasis on obtaining organizational procedures, archival records, 
reports prepared for key accounts, e-mails as well as protocols of the investigated 
firms, including two law firms. Implementing a data collection based on multiple 
sources of evidence was indispensable in the effort to explain how firms deal with 
barriers to a complete performance-based contract.  
 
Field observations were typed and logged shortly after they occurred into a self-
devised field tracking system. Field observations were classified, catalogued and 
entered into a “chronological events list” and served as a filter or index to the wider 
set of observations. This was crucial in the collection of primary data because it 
helped us carry out a closer examination and triangulation of the data and allowed us 
to examine the prior and current context of inter-firm contracts. I was also making 
periodic entries into a field diary to supplement the more formal material gathered 
about inter-firm agreements. These diary entries provided reflections on the research 
as a whole.   
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Data Analysis: From March 2013 to June 2013, I moved from data collection to data 
analysis. This involved a critical examination, evaluation, re-categorization and 
recombination of findings to identify the mechanisms that govern a performance-
based contracting. Classifying the empirical evidence, I reconstructed a graphical 
representation (see Figure 2) of eight supply relationships and captured the 
chronology and manifestations of involved contractual consent.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Counterparts’ consent to performance targets was classified in three categories: 1) 
geographical performance targets, 2) monetary performance targets and 3) 
informational monetary targets. This classification enabled us to report the complexity 
of empirical results and consider the temporal and spatial context (Pettigrew et al., 
2001).  
 
Although the identification of performance targets emerged from the data, our 
explanations did not emerge directly from the empirical data. For example, the 
conceptual framework (see Figure 1) which considers contractual performance as 
combinations of 1) contractual effectiveness, 2) contractual efficiency and 3) 
contractual risk was a product of identifying relevant knowledge gaps in the literature 
and confronting theoretical ideas with empirical observations. I found it intriguing 
that the literature on inter-firm contracting is focused on barriers to anticipating future 
performance which are considered intractable, such as trust and moral hazard in 
relationships or transactions costs that impede counterparts’ ability to anticipate 
future performance, without discussing the various ways of how firms deal with these 
barriers on the basis of a framework of agreed performance targets.  
 
I was motivated to address the research gap and posit conceptual tools that would help 
us make sense of what constitutes contractual performance. The process of data 
analysis involved several systematic cycles, whereby, I moved between theoretical 
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conceptualizations of performance outcomes and empirical evidence of consent to 
performance targets. This interplay between theoretical tools and empirical data 
differs from one-way deductive or inductive methods. In our analysis, the observed 
world of performance-based contracting was an open system in which events did not 
invariably follow a determined pattern; instead they were subject to the operation of 
mechanisms (Tsoukas, 1989; Elster, 1989; Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998). For this 
reason, I needed to engage in rigorous analytical experimentation. This effort 
encountered three major challenges, namely, the problems of contractual complexity, 
time, and comparison. Performance-based contracts are often exceedingly long 
because they incorporate a variety of contract clauses on related to performance 
targets, economic incentives, notification requirements and risks and liabilities; they 
are individualized agreements that are updated through annual trade negotiations. For 
this reason, I focused our research endeavors on eight long-term supply relationships 
(AC, AD, BC, BD, AE, AF, BE, BF) between manufacturers, retailers, and service 
providers and analyzed the agreed performance targets and specific contract clauses to 
generate reliable comparisons. When I finalized the first draft of the paper, I 
conducted feedback interviews with three firms from the first stage of data collection 
to check the validity of observations and interpretations. This feedback proved 
extremely relevant in fine-tuning our interpretations and testing the internal validity 




4. Empirical Results 
 
Contextual Setting: The study investigates performance-based contracting in the 
context of long-term supply relationships in Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Manufacturers A and B are producers of fast-moving consumer and pharmaceutical 
goods that built worldwide a reputation for developing brands. Manufacturer A’s 
market capitalization in 2012 was €87 billion and employed worldwide 127,000 full-
time employees. Manufacturer B reported in 2012 a market capitalization of €18 
billion and employed worldwide 51,000 employees. Both manufacturers supply 
retailer C and retailer D which are grocery retail chains focusing on large 
hypermarkets with an average outlet exceeding 4,000 square meters. In 2012 retailer 
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C operated 4600 outlets; employed 84, 500 employees and reported in revenues of 
€11.5 billion. In comparison, retailer D operated 9400 outlets and generating € 68.7 
billion revenues in 2011. Furthermore, manufacturers A and B collaborate with 
service provider E and service provider F which are logistics companies with 
expertise in the transportation and storage of food and drinks and well as consumer 
and pharmaceutical products. In 2012 service Provider E employed 3200 employees 
and reported revenues of €1.3 billion while service provider F employed 2800 
employees and reported revenues of €1.6 billion.   
 
Germany and the United Kingdom are the two largest markets in Europe representing 
a total population of 81 and 62 million consumers respectively (statistical data for 
2012). Multinational manufacturers of consumer and pharmaceutical products have 
expertise in the production, research and development as well as marketing of strong 
consumer brands in specific product categories, such as food and drink, laundry, 
cleaning and medical and pharmaceutical products, while grocery retailers, with their 
resource base defined by the large number of supermarkets and hypermarkets located 
in certain geographic areas, reach directly and regularly 143 million consumers. These 
consumers are not merely the final stage of the supply chain; their buying behavior, 
which is influenced by a multiplicity of socio-economic and cultural trends, provides 
the primary base of recurrent exchanges between manufacturers and retailers. 
Logistics service providers provide manufacturers and retailers with distribution and 
storage services. They are experts in supply chain management and provide services 
to multiple manufacturers and retailers.  
 
 
Continuing Relationships: Continuing, long-term supply relationships AC, AD, BC, 
BD, AE, AF, BE, BF are marked by recurrent transactions. Recurrent transactions 
mean repeated transactions over time, in the sense of repeated buying and selling. 
Figure 3 demonstrates this. The lowest average number of transactions per annum in 
the period 2011-2012 was between Manufacturer B and Retailer D (86 transactions); 
the highest average number of transactions per annum in the same period was 
between Manufacturer A and Service Provider E. There was evidence that the average 
number of transactions per annum between manufacturers and service providers (AE, 
AF, BE, BF) was significantly higher, varying between 248 and 352 transactions per 
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annum. The reason for this difference is that service providers were logistic firms that 
facilitated the storage and transportation of manufacturers’ products to multiple 
customers, such as other retailers, petrol stations and wholesalers. In comparison, the 
transactions between manufacturers and retailers (AC, AD, BC, BD) were customer-
specific transactions varying between 86 and 116 exchanges per annum. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Continuing relationships necessitate a domain consensus between counterparts over 
functions and roles in the supply chain.  Domains, however, may be disputed and 
redefined over time. It is, therefore, necessary to look at the firms’ boundary 
conditions and property rights. Manufacturers A and B are not simply producers of 
consumer and pharmaceutical products; they are also involved in research and 
development; they own patents and the property rights of brands. Nonetheless, 
manufacturers A and B need to engage with a relatively small number of major 
retailers such as retailers C and D to negotiate and agree performance target regarding 
the listing for their brands, private labels, shelf space, trade allowances and 
promotional support at retailers’ outlets. Furthermore, manufacturers A and B need 
the assets and logistics expertise of service providers E and F in the transportation and 
storage of sensitive consumer and pharmaceutical products.  
 
The service providers’ role is to facilitate cost-efficient and well-timed deliveries 
from manufacturers to retailers.  In comparison, retail chains C and D are involved in 
a direct contact with consumers; thus retailers are concerned with the competitiveness 
of their outlets and the development of a distinct image among consumers. Regular 
rounds of price increases to improve operating margins, usually at the start of a 
calendar year, create significant friction between manufacturers and retailers. Leading 
manufacturers in each product category will usually initiate a price increase, which 
will often be followed by other manufacturers of similar branded products. 
Manufacturers A and B announce wholesale price increases by issuing a new or 
revised price list. In turn, retailers’ interest is to ensure every-day low prices to 
address customer needs for value products.  
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Retailers C and D are very concerned with the increasing cost of goods bought from 
manufacturers because they have to pass on the higher prices to consumers. This 
prompts retailers C and D to introduce ‘variable pricing’ in which final consumer 
prices change continuously in accordance to value-use and generated savings; and 
encourages them to launch their own private labels produced by third-party 
manufacturers.  
 
Contracting Process: Contracting parties meet regularly in periodic and quarterly 
business reviews in which contractual performance is assessed on an on-going basis. 
The assessment of performance is feeding back to institutionalized rituals of annual 
trade negotiations in which performance-based contracts are agreed, re-confirmed or 
updated. This process allows informed consent, enhanced certainty and calculability 
of contractual performance and reduces the potential of opportunistic behavior. 
 
Specifically, in the annual trade negotiations that take place between September and 
December, service providers’ managers contact manufacturers’ logistics managers. 
Similarly, the manufacturers’ key account managers contact retailers’ purchasing 
managers to review the annual performance of their business relationship.  In 
principle, counterparts AC, AD, BC, BD, AE, AF, BE, BF are driven by their wish to 
maintain and improve their existing relationship. Counterparts recognize the value of 
their long-term supply relationships and acknowledge their determination to identify 
new, innovative ways to combine scarce resources to create joint gains. In practice, 
however, the whole contracting process is driven by: 1) the counterparts’ specific 
interests, for example, considerations of property rights to private labels or brands, 
exclusivity or liability issues or trade allowances that function as compensation for 
bearing risks; 2) the actual performance of repeated transactions, as manifested and 
monitored through information systems, such Electronic Data Interchange, 
Continuous Stock Replenishment or Vendor Managed Inventory as well as third 
parties market auditing, such as AC Nielsen and GfK;  3) the recurrent business 
interactions, for example, periodic business reviews, quarterly business reviews, and 
task reviews as well as annual negotiations in which contracts are updated on a rolling 
basis. Hence, service providers D and E, manufacturers A and B and retailers C and D 
need to negotiate with each other and reach consensus. Manufacturers may propose to 
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retailers a number of specific performance targets regarding: a) shelf space and b) 
promotional space and c) new product launches. For retailers, providing distribution 
and promotion space for existing and particularly for new product launches (which 
retailers call ‘listing’ of new products) represents a considerable risk and incremental 
‘handing’, ‘administrative’ and ‘promotion’ cost as well as incremental working 
capital requirements. For this reason, retailers demand ‘trade allowances’ which is a 
fee or payment that acts as a compensation for bearing risks in the supply chain.  
 
Moreover, the retailers demand compensation for bearing the risk of uncertain 
consumer off-takes. Therefore, retailers demand increasingly high ‘trade allowances’ 
as compensation for listing new products, weak brands or proving resource-intensive 
trade promotions. Retailers’ purchasing managers might confront manufacturers’ key 
account managers with performance targets regarding the share of private labels in the 
product portfolio.  Strong manufacturers may reject performance targets on private 
labels seeing this as a highly risky business policy it creates an asymmetric 
dependence on retail chains. Weaker manufacturers, however, are more likely to agree 
these performance targets and produce private labels because they hope to generate 
incremental sales volume without having to run expensive advertising campaigns. 
Retailers incentivize performance targets in private labels by waiving the requirement 
of trade allowances in return for obtaining all property rights to private labels.  
 
In each product category the leading manufacturer is appointed category captain by 
the retailer. Category captain serve as ‘best-practice’ firms and thus define the 
standards versus under-performers. Category captain (best-practice) firms enjoy the 
privilege of a more intensive collaboration or ‘partnership’ (as they call it) in category 
management, merchandising, shelf design projects. Underperforming firms are 
confronted by their counterparts’ with revised performance targets regarding, service 
level, net-net prices and operating margins as well as product/service portfolio. For 
example, under-performing manufacturers are confronted by retailers with 
performance targets regarding private labels. 
 
Performance Targets: Contracting parties negotiated and agreed upon physical, 
monetary, and informational performance targets. Reaching consent to performance 
targets in supply relationships (see Table 1: Performance Targets) required 
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negotiations that mobilized an extensive integration between demand and supply 
forces. Negotiations of performance targets were challenging and prolonged over a 
period of several months because of counterparts’ divergent interests and concerns.  
 
In supply relationships between manufacturers and retailers, the manufacturers were 
concerned with performance targets related to distributional and promotional support 
at the point that generates consumer demand as well their operating capacities (e.g. 
volume of shipments), utilization production, research and development of new 
products, test-markets and product launches. Thus manufacturers needed retailers’ 
consent to performance targets linked with the listing of specified brands or product 
items, distribution level (numeric distribution targets), shelf availability of their 
offering, and geographical coverage of retailers’ outlets. In contrast, retailers were 
reluctant to commit themselves to any performance targets regarding the purchasing 
volume (shipments) from manufacturers and final retail prices. These retailers, 
however, were willing to accept performance targets regarding number of products 
and services listed (listing within retail outlets), as well as numerical distribution 
targets. More importantly, retailers were concerned with performance targets that 
enabled them variable value-based pricing based on realized level of sell-out 
performance (consumer off-takes at the point of sale) and obtain trade allowances 
(which include listing fees, rebates and miscellaneous concessions) consumer off-
takes at the point of sale, competitive purchasing prices (net-net wholesale prices). 
Retailers were also concerned with performance targets related value-in use, cost 
savings, out-of-stock risks, and private labels that attract and retain end-customers. 
Despite divergent interests and concerns, counterparts were able to arrive at a mutual 
agreement regarding performance targets, incentives related to fulfilling or breaching 
the agreed performance targets and compensations for bearing some of contractual 
risks.  
 
For example, manufacturer A agreed with retailers C and D on the following:  
1) Physical Performance Targets: 
 Manufacturer A agreed with retailers C and D the exact numerical distribution 
in retail outlets (expressed as per cent of product availability in retail outlets), 
the research and development of new products in selected market segments 
(specifying all new products in the pipeline), property rights of brands and 
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private labels (property rights of brands stay with manufacturer A), as well as 
the implementation of an inter-firm Electronic Data Interchange (to enable 
accurate forecasting and a continuous stock replenishment). 
 
2) Monetary Performance Targets: 
 Manufacturer A agreed to pay retailers C and D a fix amount of trade 
allowances to compensate retailers for bearing the contractual risk of 
distributing manufacturers’ products with uncertain consumer off-takes. Trade 
allowances that manufacturer A had to pay were specific to stock keeping 
units (SKU). The trade allowances of new SKUs with uncertain consumer off-
takes were higher, while trade allowances for high-performing SKUs (with 
proven record of consumer off-takes) were lower. Moreover, manufacturer A 
agreed with retailers C and D a 30 days delay of payment. The delay of 
payment compensated retailers for the time lag between stock replenishment 
and consumer off-takes.  Moreover, Manufacturer A agreed with retailers on 
cost savings targets that enhance space profitability. Cost savings targets 
included specific spending targets on research and development and net-net 
prices of recently introduced private labels. 
 
3) Informational performance targets: 
 Informational targets that manufacturer A agreed with retailers referred to 
Electronic Data Interchange, Continuous Stock Replenishment, Scanner Off-
take Data, Shopper-insight, Category Management and Efficient Consumer 
Response. 
 
In supply relationships between manufacturers and logistics service suppliers, 
counterparts had joint interest in transferring a large share of responsibility to logistics 
service providers. Nonetheless, logistics service provider E was concerned with the 
achievement of a sufficiently high value-in-use and the pay-back period of capital-
intensive investments in trucks, technology and systems. Therefore, negotiations 
between logistics service provider E and manufacturers A and B started with the 
definition of problems and needs (buying logistics performances that address these 
needs completely and moved gradually to calculations of value-in-use and investment 
valuations on the basis on the net present value of anticipated future streams of costs 
 21 
and revenues. Logistics service provider E was able to agree with manufacturers A 
and B upon ‘what was needed’ and translate needs into performance targets to be 
achieved. Counterparts were able to arrive at a mutual agreement regarding 
performance targets and incentives related to fulfilling or breaching the agreed 
performance targets. Specifically, logistics service provider E agreed with 
manufacturers upon 1) physical performance targets regarding the geographical 
coverage of logistics and warehousing services, cross-docking, distribution targets 
and delivery times, as well as facilitating technologies and systems, 2) monetary 
performance targets regarding the value per unit and value-in-use, delays in payments, 
capital investments in systems and technologies and research spending in new 
innovative applications that enhance operational efficiencies 3) informational 
performance targets regarding electronic data interchange, continuous stock 
replenishment, scanner off-take data and efficiency consumer response. Moreover, 
logistics service provider agreed with manufacturers upon incremental informational 
performance targets in category management, because this enabled them to generate 
synergies within the product category of consumer and pharmaceutical products.  
 
Table 1 shows that performance targets were not restricted to physical and monetary 
targets but involved complex informational targets, such as electronic data 
interchange that were strengthening the informational links and reducing information 
asymmetries among contracting parties. Consider the informational performance 
targets between manufacturer A and retailer C. Retailer C scanner data are linked with 
manufacturer A’s production and warehousing and a continuous stock replenishment 
enables counterparts a more precise demand forecasting and the achievement of 
performance targets related a reduction of out-of-stock situations. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Performance-based Contract Clauses: Physical, monetary and informational 
performance targets had been underpinned by binding performance-based contract 
clauses (see Table 2). Performance-based contract clauses express a framework of 
 22 
legally binding principles and rules that incentivize and compel counterparts to 
achieve agreed performance targets; and thus enhance the certainty and enforceability 
of contractual performance. These binding principles and rules emphasize the 
importance of information flow and notification requirements. For example, 
manufacturer A agreed with retailer C a technical clause that “mutual notification is 
required for all future capital investment and R&D’ and that an ‘electronic data 
interchange” is established to allow an on-going performance monitoring. 
Notification requirements for capital investments and R&D aimed at improving 
counterparts’ the strategic planning process while electronic data interchange aimed at 
improving the operational efficiency of the continuous stock replenishment.    
  
There is evidence that contract clauses had been used in a variety of ways and this is 
traced back to the observed diversity of norms and counterparties’ values and 
interests. For example, manufacturer A agreed with retailer D that payment is due in 
30 days and that delivery cost is paid by the supplier. Manufacturer B stipulated 
performance-based clauses with retailers that regulated the “transfer of property 
rights” and “confidentiality” but was concerned with logistics service providers’ 
‘risks’, ‘liabilities’ and the “obligation to remedy deficiencies applied to services 
obtained from subcontractors”. Similarly, manufacturer B agreed with logistics 
service providers that the manufacturer maintains “the right to obtain competitive 
offers at any time”. 
 
Legally all investigated performance-based contracts were indefinite framework 
contracts which were re-confirmed and updated annually. Thus, contracting parties 
had the right to terminate the agreement giving one year’s prior notice. A part of 
performance-based contracts refers to property rights and assurances that that no third 
person has obtained property rights. This is particularly relevant in two areas: a) 
intellectual property rights on resources, ideas and art work that affect contractual 
performance; and, b) control over private labels or manufacturer brands.  For 
example, in supply relationship BD, manufacturer B ensured that no third party has 
obtained property rights over private labels.   
 
Similarly, the evidence suggests that contract clauses on exclusivity rights and 
confidentiality are critical for performing the contract. For example, manufacturer B 
 23 
agreed with retailer C that “all information exchanged is confidential” and “shall not 
to be available to third parties without written consent of the other party”. Exclusion 
or force majeure clauses addressed risks that could occur as a result of contextual 
contingencies. For example, all investigated contracts included a force majeure clause 
that parties “bear no liability for damages occurred as a result of war, political 
unrest, strikes, lockouts, and governmental interventions”. To create an in-built 
contractual flexibility to embrace innovative business opportunities, contracting 
parties may insert saving clauses. For example, manufacturer A agreed with retailer B 
that “unless it is of major importance, invalidity of one or more clauses will not have 
any effect on the agreement as a whole”.   
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 




5. Analysis and Discussion  
 
The conceptual framework is now used to provide a theoretical structure for the 
analysis of empirical evidence. In line with the conceptual framework (see Figure 1), I 
consider contractual performance as specific combinations of contractual 
effectiveness, contractual efficiency, and contractual risk (Kotabe, 1998; Mentzer & 
Konrad, 1991; Kotler, Jain & Maesincee, 2002; Mouzas, 2006). The framework 
allows us to move on our analysis to a higher aggregation level and make sense of the 
empirical evidence of how firms anticipate future performance in long-term supply 
relationships. Specifically, the conceptual framework (see Figure 1) addresses the 
theoretical deficiency of what it means performance and allows us to connect the 
ingredients that constitute contractual performance with the empirical evidence of 
counterparts’ consent to a performance-based contracting. 
 
Although extant research work on barriers to anticipating future performance (Hobbs, 
1996; Hobbs and Young, 2000; Cachon & Lariviere, 2001, 2005; Williamson, 2008) 
is significant, extant research provides limited insights on the question of how firms 
attempt to overcome these barriers. The empirical evidence indicates that counterparts 
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AC, AD, BC, BD, AE, AF, BE, BF were able to overcome some of the barriers to 
anticipating future performance that existing literature points out (Tirole, 1986; Hart 
& Moore, 1989; Maskin & Tirole, 1999; Brown et al., 2004; Taylor & Plambeck, 
2007; Reuer & Arino, 2007; Furlotti, 2007) and develop a performance-based 
contracting on the basis of mutual consent to  a) performance targets, b) and incentive 
mechanisms related to fulfilling or breaching the agreed performance targets.  
 
Contracting parties AC, AD, BC, BD, AE, AF, BE, BF were able to cope with the 
following transaction costs: First, information asymmetries and unforeseen contextual 
contingencies (Maskin & Tirole, 1999; Tirole, 2009) have been dealt with the 
implementation of an electronic data interchange and periodic as well as quarterly 
business reviews. Second, drafting costs (Williamson, 1979, 2008; Mouzas & Blois, 
2013) were reduced because all transactions occurred under the umbrella of an 
ongoing performance-based contract. Third, enforcement costs were reduced by the 
introduction of self-enforcing non-legal sanctions (Bernstein, 1992; Charny, 1990; 
Scott, 2003), such as delisting of brands or services. Fourth, renegotiation 
requirements (Segal, 1999; Tirole, 2009) were addressed by institutionalized 
processes of annual trade negotiations in which contracts were confirmed and updated 
on a rolling basis. 
 
The agreed contract clauses (see table 3: Analysis of Performance-based Contracting) 
demonstrate that performance that companies buy and sell can be analyzed as specific 
combinations of effectiveness, efficiency, and risk. Counterparts deliberately avoided 
performance targets that are related to volumes or final prices. The evidence suggests 
that counterparts AC, AD, BC and BD agreed that volumes and prices will be agreed 
in the future.   
 
These agreed contract clauses in conjunction with performance targets related to 
consumer off-takes, brand awareness, consumer penetration and distribution levels 
verified by 3rd parties, such as GfK and ACNielsen, aimed at enhancing contractual 
effectiveness to respond to emerging opportunities and enable business growth. On 
the other hand, the agreed clauses between AC, AD that payment in due in 30 days 
and delivery cost is paid by the supplier or the agreed clauses with service providers E 
and F that pricing is based on a variable value-based and the specific performance 
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targets related Electronic Data Interchange and Continuous Stock Replenishment 








There is also evidence of agreed clauses that commit parties to remedy deficiencies 
applied to services obtained from subcontractors and defined proprietary sanctions. 
Parties would bear no responsibility and liability for any faults that may have been 
caused outside their direct domain of action. Such prudential measures aimed at risk 
hedging against potential but unknown risks and obtaining compensation when there 
is a breach of contract.  
 
Contractual effectiveness, contractual efficiency and contractual risk are analytical 
lenses that allow us to identify conflicts and incompatibilities in achieving contractual 
performance. Although counterparts in relationships AC, AD, BC, BD, AE, AF, BE, 
BF tried to strike a balance between contractual effectiveness, contractual efficiency 
and contractual risk, they faced tremendous difficulties in achieving excellence in all 
performance outcomes. The evidence indicates that retail chains C and D and logistics 
firms E and F were obsessed with enhancing contractual efficiency and minimizing 
risk exposure; they constantly pressed to negotiate value-in-use, counterparts’ cost 
savings, and relentlessly passed on risks to their contracting counterparts. 
Notwithstanding exceptions, such those evidence in supply relationships AE and BE, 
the systematic bias towards efficiency gains and risk hedging prevented retailers from 
pursuing effectiveness increases through innovation and investments in new systems 
and initiatives, such as category management, test-markets or product re-launches.  
 
Dealing with efficiency and risk in contract performance and neglecting the 
effectiveness of contractual arrangements means ignoring the creation of new, 
innovative sources of value. It appears that the emphasis on efficiency and risk 
hedging is deeply rooted in managers’ assumption that the market will eliminate 
businesses that operate less efficiently than their competitors (Moran & Ghoshal, 
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1999). Consequently, firms implement activity-based costing (Kaplan & Cooper, 
1998), cost reductions, outsourcing, and put unyielding pressure on their suppliers 
(Sullivan, 1997; Mouzas & Naude, 2003; Mouzas & Araujo, 2000).  
 
While some of the investigated firms neglected the relevance of contractual 
effectiveness, there is compelling evidence that other firms systematically 
underestimate the multiplying effect of operating margins; they underestimate 
contractual efficiency.  One British retailer, for example, pursued an aggressive 
expansion of retail outlets despite declining operating margins. Financial distress 
emerged and the retailer could not sustain its contractual commitments with 
manufacturers and logistics service supplier. The pressure to operate with the lowest 
possible margins appears particularly strong in Germany. German retailers, 
specifically, sell at ‘everyday low price’ and thus they put pressure on logistics 
service providers to generate further savings and manufacturers to enhance efficiency 
of performance in the delivery of products and services.  
 
The emphasis on low price and slim operating margins may be attributed to the 
dominance of hard-discounters and the high price-sensitivity among end-users in 
Germany. As a consequence, retailers, manufacturers and service providers in 
Germany turn to internationalization to benefit from exports into markets with higher 
operating margins and utilize their production and service capabilities. Mass (2005) 
provides an excellent illustration of the challenge of balanced performance. Achieving 
a marginal increase of sustainable business growth appears to be more difficult than 
achieving a marginal improvement in operating margin.  
 
This difficulty may explain why business managers often choose the easiest way of 
improving their contractual efficiency instead of enhancing contractual effectiveness. 
Performing contractual effectiveness requires innovative combination of resources, 
experimentation, time and the acceptance of a calculated risk exposure. Prior 
contractual commitments to perform pre-specified outcomes, however, may limit 
counterparts’ ability to differentiate or change their contractual arrangements in the 
future (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999). The present study confirms that new, innovative 
sources of value were specific to counterparts AC, AD, BC, BD, AE, AF, BE, BF that 
created them and counterparts are usually specifically prepared for them by their pre-
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history of contractual arrangements. For example, by institutionalizing annual trade 
negotiations and quarterly business reviews, counterparts AC, AD, BC, BD, AE, AF, 
BE, BF were able to enhance their effectiveness in responding to emerging 
opportunities in the business landscape and flexibly update their pre-existing 
agreements. Similarly, the agreement to implement a continuous stock replenishment 
acted as an early warning system to alert counterparts about imminent problems. 
Extant research (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Das & Teng, 1999; Das & Teng, 2000; 
Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007; Reuer & Arino, 2003, 2007) points out long-term supply 
relationships enable counterparts to put greater effort into contingency planning in 
performance targets, which is consistent with learning effects over time (Argyres et 
al., 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). In this way, long-term supply relationships appear 
to be conducive to a performance-based contracting. 
 
 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
 
The study has demonstrated that firms in long-term supply relationships are able to 
overcome barriers to anticipating future performance and develop a performance-
based contracting. Firms are able to negotiate and agree upon performance targets and 
underpin these targets with specific contract clauses that incentivize and compel 
counterparts to achieve agreed performance targets. Performance-based contracting in 
long term supply relationships enables counterparts to implement variable value-
based pricing based on realized level of performance, such incremental revenues, 
consumer off-takes, cost savings; and simultaneously obtain compensation in the form 
of trade allowances for bearing contractual risks.   
 
Performance-based contracts in long-term supply relationships draw our attention to 
two intriguing aspects.  Firstly, relational and implicit norms embedded in customs 
and practices in supply chains are transformed into explicit performance targets and 
contract clauses. Thus, performance-based contracts introduce shared values and give 
a sense of purpose; they codify the parties’ knowledge about a) effective, b) efficient 
and c) prudent ways to buy solutions to business problems; and, hence, become 
“knowledge repositories” (Mayer & Argyres, 2004, p. 405) and reference points (Hart  
& Moore, 2008). The evidence that the primary concern of performance-based 
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contracting is with sharing knowledge between contracting parties is supported by 
studies of strategic alliance contracts (Taylor & Plambeck, 2007; Reuer & Arino, 
2007).  These studies demonstrate that sharing knowledge among firms deepens inter-
partner communication and lead to a tacit development of contractual provisions for 
troubleshooting. Secondly, the function of performance-based contracting is not to 
predetermine contractual decisions but to provide a framework (Weber & Mayer, 
2011) within which expectations and contractual decisions conducive to performance 
can be made. This functional particularity is crucial for understanding how firms 
engage in a performance-based contracting with each other.  Scholarly work on 
contracts has obscured the difference between contractual decisions and the 
performance framework where contractual decisions are made. The above functional 
differentiation is critical in advancing our theory on how companies overcome 
barriers to anticipating future performance to arrive at a genuine consent to 
performance targets.  
 
Empirical evidence and theory suggests that, absent genuine consent (Barnett, 1986; 
Barnett, 2002), contractual arrangements are not sustainable because they do not 
facilitate the creation of the maximum potential value (Kronman & Posner, 1979; 
Sebenius, 1992).  This is apparent in the frequent instabilities of those business 
partnerships and contractual arrangements which fail to manage tensions such as 
“cooperation versus competition, rigidity versus flexibility or short-term versus long-
term orientation” (Das & Teng, 2000, p.94).  Instabilities are evident in the 
engagement of retailers in private labels, as private labels can be regarded as a 
deliberate attempt by grocery retailers to invade domains that are traditionally the 
preserve of consumer goods manufacturers (Dunne & Narasimhan, 1999; Narasimhan 
& Wilcox, 1998). 
 
Contracting parties consent to a framework of performance targets because they 
derive benefits from ‘framing’ the whole contracting process according to a set of 
objectified end-results. Performance-based contracting: a) reduces the costs of 
running recurrent transactions; b) provides certainty and calculability regarding the 
conditions under which performance may take place; and, c) reduces information 







Managerial Implications  
Business Managers and management teams involved in business procurement could 
carry, champion, and mediate the following guiding principles in designing and 
negotiating a performance-based contracting: 
 
Foster a shared understanding of what constitutes performance: Fostering a 
shared understanding of performance requires a continuous effort to 1) define 
performance targets and 2) monitor specific performance. Procurement Managers 
should not take a ‘shared understanding’ of performance for granted. A practical way 
to approach this challenge is to consider performance-based contracting as ‘work-in-
progress’ or recurrent practice of setting performance targets from an end-user 
perspective and then institutionalizing a process of monitoring performance targets 
through recurrent business interactions, such as negotiation episodes, periodic or 
quarterly business reviews. 
 
Link performance targets with explicit contract clauses: Business managers 
involved in the procurement need to be aware that performance targets need to be 
complemented by legally enforceable contract clauses that guide ‘shared principles’ 
and ‘shared data’, so that they can be used practically to govern individual 
transactions. Electronic data interchange, open-book agreements, framework 
agreements or memoranda of understandings between the supplier and buyer firm, 
can facilitate this endeavor. It is critical that ‘shared principles’ and ‘shared data’ are 
supported by explicitly stated, high-powered incentives that energize counterparts to 
achieve the agreed performance targets. 
 
Achieve a balanced performance-based contracting: It is challenging to achieve a 
balance between a) effective, b) efficient and c) prudent ways of contracting. Yet to 
maximize a sustainable return on assets, business managers involved in the 
procurement need to be aware that performance-based contracting rests on wholeness 
and coherence. Contractual effectiveness requires different managerial capabilities 
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than those needed for dealing with contractual efficiency or for dealing with 
contractual risk. Effectiveness requires procurement managers to improve their firm’s 
capacity to generate sustainable growth in their supply relationship; efficiency 
involves discipline and control over operating margins and working capital 
requirements; and risk necessitates prudence and foresight. To achieve a balanced 
performance-based contracting in long-term relationships, managers need to develop 
new applications, such as indefinite framework contracts that require 1) the 
integration of external potentials and internal capabilities, 2) the synchronization of 
short-term and long-term performance, 3) the co-existence of co-operation with 
partners to create value and competition with counterparts to claim value, 4) the 
harmonization of the general relational norms of practice and the specific contract 
clauses that incentivize performance, and 5) the symbiosis of the past contracting and 
the future contracting.  
 
Future Research   
This research outcome could stimulate a research agenda along two themes: First, 
empirical investigation is needed on how performance-based contracting can 
contribute to a sustainable business growth. Resources that are market-based 
(Shrivastava et al., 1990), knowledge-based (Mouzas & Ford, 2012) or brand-based 
(Barwise et al., 1990) are recognized as significant in the process of performing 
sustainable growth. Nonetheless, our knowledge of how firms structure a 
performance-based contracting that is conducive to a sustainable growth is still 
limited. Second, more empirical research is needed on performance-based contracting 
deals with risk exposure. Firms tend to pass on risks to their suppliers; nonetheless, 
firms are not immune from external risks, even if the risks are diversified away. The 
recent crisis in financial institutions has demonstrated this (Mouzas & Ford, 2011). As 
firms contract within interconnected supply relationships, risks are transmitted from 
one relationship to the next; and the adverse impact on firms may be amplified, even 
if risks originate from seemingly distant parts of a supply chain. Dealing with this 
kind of contractual risk is not about hedging against counterparty’s risk; instead, it is 
about dealing with a potentially indirect counterparty’s counterparty risk. The present 
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Figure 1: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Performance  
 
Contractual  Efficiency 
Generating a contractual surplus 
above the opportunity cost
Operational excellence measured 
by operating margins
Contractual Effectiveness
Providing solutions that meet end-
user needs completely 
Measured by share of market,  
sales revenues, customer off-take, 
satisfaction, brand awareness  
Contractual  Risk 
Potentially adverse impact on the 
performance of contracts 
Measured by the probability multiplied 
by the size of material damage or 




























Figure 3: Number of Transactions per Annum (2011-2012) 
 
A: Multinational Consumer Goods/ pharmaceutical Firm 
B: Multinational Consumer goods/ pharmaceutical Firm 
C: Grocery Retail Chain 
D: Grocery Retail Chain 
E: Logistics Service Provider 
F: Logistics Service Provider 
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Table 1: Performance Targets 
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Geographical coverage  
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Distribution targets  Numeric  
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Net-net price  
 
Value per unit 
 
X X   X X X X 
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Space profitability  
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Electronic data interchange 
 
Units (SKU) X X X X X X X X 
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Table 2: Performance-based Contract Clauses 
Relevant Areas Contract Clauses AC AD BC BD AE AF BE BF 
Volume / Prices 
 
Volume and Prices to be agreed  
Continuous monitoring of consumer off-take data 
X X X X     
Terms of Payment 
 
Payment in 30 days; delivery cost is paid by the supplier.  
 
X X   X X X X 
Termination Rights 
 
Each party has the right to terminate the agreement giving one year’s 
prior notice 
X X X X     
Subcontracting 
 
Parties are not allowed pass on performance of agreed duties to a 3rd 
party, unless a written consent has been obtained. 
    X X X X 
Saving Clause 
 
Unless it is of major importance, invalidity of one or more clauses 
will not have any effect on the agreement as a whole 
X X X X     
Renegotiation 
 
Parties agree to resolve disputes using their best efforts, in good faith 
in direct negotiations within a period of 30 days. 
Annual Renegotiation/ Quarterly Business Reviews (QBR) 
X X X X QBR QBR QBR QBR 
Property Rights 
 
Supplier ensures that no third person has obtained property rights X X X X     
Product/Service 
Category 





Mutual notification regarding all future capital investment and R&D X X X X     
Liability/Risks 
 
Parties bear no responsibility and liability for any faults that may 
have been caused outside their direct domain of action. 
The obligation to remedy deficiencies applies also to services 
obtained from subcontractors/ proprietary sanctions are defined 
Forecloses may include reputational damage. 
    X X X X 
 
Legal Venue  
 
London / Zurich 
X X X X     
Information Flow 
 
It is agreed to establish an Electronic Data Interchange X X X X X X X X 
Force Majeure 
 
Parties bear no liability for damages occurred as a result of war, 
political unrest, strikes, lockouts, and governmental interventions 
X X X X X X X X 
Exclusivity 
 
Parties have the right to obtain competitive offers at any time     X X X X 
Duration 
 
Indefinite Agreement (IA)  updated annually on a rolling basis IA IA IA IA IA IA IA IA 






All information exchanged is confidential and shall not to be 
available to third parties without written consent of the other party 






Table 3: Analysis of Performance-based Contracting   
  
 
Performance Outcomes  
  
 












• Continuous monitoring of consumer off-take data 
• Continuous monitoring of brand awareness, 
consumer penetration and distribution levels by a 
3rd parties (GfK, ACNielsen 
• Subcontracting is only possible upon consent 
• Unless it is of major importance, invalidity of one 
or more clauses will not have any effect on the 
agreement as a whole 
• Parties have the right to obtain competitive offers 
at any time 
• It is agreed a Vendor-Managed Inventory 
• All information exchanged is confidential and 
shall not to be available to third parties without 










• Payment in 30 days; delivery cost is paid by the 
supplier.  
• Variable value-based pricing;  value-in-use 
• Listing fees for all new product/service 
introductions 
• Mutual notification regarding all future capital 
investment and R&D 
• It is agreed to establish an Electronic Data 
Interchange 









• Parties are not allowed pass on performance of 
agreed duties to a 3rd party. 
• The obligation to remedy deficiencies applies also 
to services obtained from subcontractors 
• Annual Renegotiation/ Quarterly Business 
Reviews (QBR) 
• Supplier ensures that no third person has obtained 
property rights 
• Parties bear no liability for damages occurred as a 
result of war, political unrest, strikes, lockouts, 
and governmental interventions (exclusion terms) 
• Arbitration through the International Chapter of 
Commerce 
• Volume and Prices to be agreed  







   
  
